This paper reports a systematic examination of the determinants of deposit-related retail banking fees using a set of survey data that is unusual for its size, specificity, and sampling properties. The analysis focuses explicitly on six different fees associated with checking accounts and automated teller machine (ATM) usage. A preliminary analysis documents that, on average, multimarket banks charge substantially higher fees than do typically smaller, single-market banks. A more detailed econometric analysis yields results consistent with predictions of recent models. In particular, it finds that the greater the presence of multimarket banks in the local market, the higher are the retail deposit fees of single-market banks (except in highly concentrated markets) and the weaker is the positive relationship between those fees and market concentration.
Introduction
As a source of bank income, fees have become increasingly important in recent years. Increases in retail fees in particular have been the subject of sharp criticism from some quarters, and at least one congressional investigation into the likely causes has been conducted. 1 Despite the space devoted to this subject in the financial and mainstream press, academic studies have tended to focus on the deposit interest rates offered by banking institutions rather than on the deposit-related fees charged by them. A possible reason for this lack of attention is that, compared to the availability of information on deposit rates, systematic data on the retail fees of a large number of financial institutions is hard to come by. Also, as any retail depositor can attest, a bewildering number of different fees exist, and many of them can interact with account characteristics in ways that make it difficult to compare fees systematically across institutions. For example, to compare a monthly account fee across institutions, one must account for different minimum-balance requirements and ancillary services offered the account holder.
This paper employs an extensive set of survey data that is unusual for its size, specificity, and sampling properties to examine the relationship between various depositrelated fees of depository institutions and hypothesized determinants of those fees. The analysis avoids retail fees that are difficult to compare across institutions and the more obscure or less frequently levied retail fees. This leaves as the focus of the study six fairly common fees that can be more easily compared across institutions, including fees associated with checks drawn on insufficient funds, fees levied to stop payment on a check, and fees incurred when the depositor of one institution uses another institution's automated teller machine (ATM).
Theory and past empirical findings regarding deposit interest rates point to two of the usual suspects--market structure and institution size--as likely determinants of the retail fees that depository institutions charge their customers. The traditional structureconduct-performance paradigm asserts that more-concentrated market structures make noncompetitive behavior more likely or more pronounced. Numerous studies have found evidence consistent with this prediction regarding deposit interest rates, but no study has reported such a relationship regarding bank fees.
Institution size may serve as a proxy for many factors, including, most obviously, differences in the marginal costs of providing deposit services. Several recent studies have argued (or noted as a possibility) that, beyond some point, larger institutions do not find it in their interest to attract increasingly "marginal" retail depositors. The reason offered is that larger institutions have greater access to wholesale funds that (at least beyond some point) are cheaper than retail funds. 2 Consistent with the implications of such a funding advantage, these studies report evidence that larger banking institutions tend to offer lower deposit interest rates than do smaller institutions. 3 The equivalent implication regarding deposit-related fees is that larger institutions charge higher retail fees than do smaller ones, because they do not find it in their interest to use lower fees to 1 A 1994 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and Insurance, chaired by Representative Joseph Kennedy, led off with the testimony of a Girl Scout who, because of retail fees, had lost all her collected cookie money to a bank. 2 See Hannan and Prager (2004) , Kiser (2004) , and Park and Pennacchi (2005) .
attract less profitable retail customers. This argument may be particularly relevant if the fee in question relates to behavior (such as overdrawing an account) that might indicate a less profitable depositor.
Still another issue raised by the recent literature concerns the presence of large multimarket institutions in geographic areas traditionally treated as local banking markets. Substantial evidence suggests that, at least in the case of deposit interest rates, a bank often offers the same rate for a given type of account in all the local areas in which it operates. 4 If local market areas remain relevant for single-market banks and if large multimarket banks tend to offer lower deposit rates in those markets because they have greater access to wholesale funds--as Park and Pennacchi (2005) explicitly model and as Hannan and Prager (2004) speculate--then one may infer that the deposit rates of single-market banks decline as the presence of large multimarket banks in the local market increases. As discussed in more detail below, one may also infer that the role of market structure in affecting the deposit rates of single-market banks diminishes as the presence of multimarket banks increases. Using different data sets, both Hannan and Prager (2004) and Park and Pennacchi (2005) report results that are strongly consistent with these implications. This paper reports tests of the equivalent hypotheses as they apply to retail fees.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a heuristic description of two spatial models of bank competition that have appeared recently in the literature and that yield predictions regarding the role of multimarket banks and relevant interactions 3 A further implication of this "wholesale funding advantage" argument is that larger institution may also charge lower loan rates than do smaller ones-a prediction confirmed most recently in a study by Berger, Rosen, and Udell (2005) . 4 See Radecki (1998) and Heitfield (1999) .
with market structure. Section 3 presents the empirical model designed to test the implications of these theories, and section 4 describes the data and measurement of relevant variables. Section 5 presents results, and section 6 provides a summary and conclusions. Many of the predictions of these models are supported by the data for several of the retail fees included in the study, with the interesting exception of one of the ATM fees examined.
Models of Retail Deposit Pricing
Two spatial models of retail deposit pricing have appeared in the recent literature, and both may be used to derive predictions of interest in this study. A qualification to the use of these models as a guide, however, is the fact that they relate explicitly to deposit interest rates rather than deposit-related fees. It does not automatically follow that institutions that raise deposit rates in response to some source of competitive pressure will invariably reduce deposit-related fees as well. Also, depositors at single-market and multimarket banks may be quite different in terms of their valuations of the tradeoff between deposit rates and deposit fees, and this may result in substantial differences in the importance of the interaction between single-market and multimarket banks as they apply to the two types of prices. It does, however, seem most reasonable that, in response to a change in the competitive environment, any optimal combination of deposit rates and fees would generally entail movement of both types of prices either in the direction that benefits or in the direction that harms the depositor. This would imply opposite predictions regarding the impact of measures of the competitive environment on deposit rates and retail deposit fees. We adopt this presumption in deriving predictions concerning deposit-related fees and, of course, subject these predictions to testing, as reported below.
The first of these studies, by Barros (1999) , was employed by Hannan and Prager (2004) to guide empirical estimation of the relationship between bank deposit rates and several explanatory variables, including local market structure, multimarket bank presence, and variables relevant to spatial competition. The second study, by Park and Pennacchi (2005) , addresses more explicitly the advantage that greater access to cheaper wholesale funds may provide large multimarket banking institutions. They derive the implications of that advantage for the levels of the retail deposit rates and loan rates of multimarket banks and, through spatial interactions, the levels of retail deposit rates and loan rates chosen by single-market competitors.
Both models start with the illustrative assumption, common in spatial models, of a market characterized by a circle on which firms (bank branches in this case) are located.
Depositors, located uniformly along the circle, choose the most attractive bank in terms of net returns on deposits adjusted for the costs of visiting its branches. These models yield transportation costs and distances (and therefore the extent of a bank's branch network) as important determinants of bank choice.
The effect of multimarket banking in these models can be illustrated by presuming that at least one of the branches is owned by a large multimarket bank that, because of a wholesale funding advantage, offers the local depositor lower deposit rates (and perhaps charges higher deposit-related fees). 5 Because of competitive interactions 5 Park and Pennachi (2005) also presume lower marginal deposit-related costs at large multimarket banks, so this presumption of lower deposit interest rates at multimarket banks follows only if the negative impact on deposit interest rates of a funding advantage is large enough to outweigh the positive effect on deposit rates of lower marginal costs.
with branches owned by neighboring single-market banks, both models predict that neighboring single-market banks will also reduce deposit interest rates (and perhaps increase deposit-related fees).
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While there are some differences in underlying assumptions, both models yield the prediction that as the number of branches owned by multimarket banks (with a sufficient funding advantage) increases, single-market banks will lower their deposit interest rates, raise their deposit-related fees, or do both. The reason is that, on average, the single-market bank will be more likely to be a neighbor of a multimarket bank (Barros, 1999) or, on average, be closer to a branch of a multimarket bank (Park and Pennacchi, 2005 ).
Both models predict that, as concentration increases, deposit interest rates of single-market banks decline, deposit-related fees increase, or both occur. These predictions agree even though the models define concentration differently. Park and Pennacchi define it as simply the number of banks (each having one branch) on a circle of a given circumference. More banks (meaning less concentration) under these circumstances imply smaller distances between them. Assuming Bertrand pricing, this implies, through the spatial interactions among neighboring competitors, higher deposit interest rates, lower deposit-related fees, or both. The Barros model can be shown to incorporate the same "distance" effect of concentration, but it also includes a conduct parameter indicating the extent to which one bank internalizes the profits of competing banks in the market. Hannan and Prager (2004) note that, to the extent that concentration influences the conduct parameter, the traditional prediction of lower deposit interest rates in more concentrated markets results.
Both models predict that, as the presence of multimarket banks in a market increases under these circumstances, the traditionally predicted relationship between local concentration and price attenuates. The primary reason is that, with the prices of multimarket banks unaffected by local market structure (or at least less affected because they reflect a weighted average of the conditions in many markets), any concentrationinduced change in the price offered or charged by single-market banks would entail a loss of customers to the branches of multimarket banks. The more branches of multimarket banks in the market, the greater would be the loss in customers to multimarket banks and hence the weaker would be the relationship between concentration and price.
The evidence in support of these predictions as they apply to retail deposit rates is quite strong. Using different data sources, Hannan and Prager (2004) and Park and Pennacchi (2005) report evidence that large multimarket banks offer lower retail deposit rates than do single-market banks operating in the same local markets, a finding consistent with the implications of a funding advantage of multimarket banks (but also consistent with other explanations). Hannan and Prager (2004) 
Test
The strategy employed to test the basic predictions of these theories is to focus on the pricing behavior of banks and thrift institutions that operate in only one local area The six fees studied in the analysis are (1) the stop-payment fee, defined as the fee charged the account holder for stopping payment on a check; (2) the "nsf" fee, defined as the fee charged the account holder for writing a check that is returned for "not sufficient funds"; (3) the overdraft fee, which is a fee charged for writing a check on insufficient funds, but in this case the check is honored by the account holder's bank; (4) the "deposit items returned" fee, which is a fee typically charged an account holder who deposits (rather than writes) a check that is drawn on insufficient funds; (5) the ATM foreign fee, defined as a fee charged the account holder by the account holder's institution for withdrawing cash at an ATM not owned by the institution; and (6) the ATM surcharge, which is the fee typically charged nondepositors of an institution for use of the institution's ATMs.
The models discussed above suggest that for the typical fee, the predictions for the coefficients in (1) follows in the case of the typical fee, because, as will be seen, large multimarket banks typically charge higher retail fees than do single-market banks. Thus, a larger share of competitors' branches that are owned by multimarket banks means that a branch of a high-fee multimarket bank is more likely to be a neighbor (Barros, 1999) to the singlemarket bank or on average closer to it (Park and Pennacchi, 2005) . Implicit in this prediction is the assumption that the fees of interest are strategic complements, whereby a higher price charged by one firm causes competitors to charge a higher price as well. Finally, the share of market branches owned by the single-market bank is predicted to be positively related to the bank's retail fees 6 ( 0) β > . This prediction is 8 As discussed below, this assumption may be violated in the case of the ATM fees examined. It also bears emphasizing that no claim is made here that multimarket banks charge higher fees because they operate in multiple markets. A more likely reason for their higher fees is that they are typically quite large and therefore have access to funding not available to smaller single-market institutions.
implied by Barro's (1999) spatial model, wherein a bank with more branches is likely to have a greater share of customers for whom one of the bank's branches is the next best alternative to another. This allows the bank to exploit this "spatial market power" by charging higher fees. 9 As Barros makes clear, proximity may be expressed in terms of product space as well as geographic space, so the measure may be thought of more generally as capturing firm-specific market power.
The log of market population is also employed as an explanatory variable for the purpose of control. Because of the many unknown differences that may exist between larger and smaller market areas, no prediction is offered regarding the sign of its coefficient.
A potentially important exception to the prediction of a positive impact of β > may be the ATM foreign fee. As noted above, this prediction in the typical case assumes that the fees in question are strategic compliments, so that the higher fees charged by multimarket banks induce an increase in the fees charged by competing single-market banks. This is a reasonable presumption in the case of the typical bank fee (the nsf fee, for example), because an increase in such a fee by multimarket banks should cause an increase in demand for the services of competing single-market banks. This prediction is least likely to follow, however, in the case of the ATM foreign fee. A primary reason is that the levying of the ATM surcharge, as is often argued, can actually attract depositors to a bank with many ATMs.
The reason is that an account with the bank allows the customer to avoid the surcharge when using the bank's ATMs. Under these circumstances, a reduction in the foreign fee 9 Since the model by Park and Pennacchi (2005) does not allow more than one branch per bank in a market, it does not address this issue. Hannan and Prager (2004) 
Data
The data on retail fees are obtained from two annual surveys--one conducted in 1999 and the other in 2001--by Moebs Services of Lake Bluff, Illinois. These data were obtained through telephone interviews of approximately 1,000 U.S. banks and thrift suggested by their use of the Barros model, to account for this phenomenon. 10 More precisely, the elasticity of transaction demand with respect to the foreign fee might increase with higher surcharges levied by competing multimarket banks, resulting in lower optimal foreign fees charged by single-market banks. This effect, unlike the first, is symmetric, implying that a higher foreign fee charged by multimarket banks could also result in a lower surcharge levied by single-market bank competitors.
institutions in the 1999 survey and approximately 600 such institutions in the 2001 survey. Financial institutions were chosen for interview according to a stratified random sample, with region of the country and institution size categories serving as the strata.
This data source is particularly desirable for the purposes of this study because the sample design produces a large number of observations of smaller, single-market banks.
For reasons of comparability across institutions, as well as general prominence of the fee, the six retail deposit-related fees, described above, chosen for study are the stop payment fee, the nsf fee, the overdraft fee, the fee for "deposit items returned," the ATM foreign fee, and the ATM surcharge. As in previous literature, local banking markets are defined as either metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) or non-MSA counties. For purposes of this analysis, a singlemarket bank is one that derives at least 90 percent of its deposit from the observed market, and a multimarket bank is one that derives less than 30 percent of its deposits from that market. These definitions are chosen because of the expectation that a bank deriving at least 90 percent of its deposits from a single market will set retail fees based 11 Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) and Massoud, Saunders, and Scholnick (2003) present interesting models of the role and determinants of ATM surcharges and, in the latter work, empirical tests of implications. Neither study, however, addresses the role of ATM foreign fees. 12 Other fees available from the survey--such as the fee charged for the return of cancelled checks and the fee charged for use of ATMs owned by the depositor's own institution--are not included because banks rarely impose them.
primarily on conditions prevailing in that particular market, whereas a bank deriving less than 30 percent of its deposits from a particular market may set its fees based largely on conditions prevailing in other markets that it serves. Most banks that are classified as multimarket banks in our sample derive far less than 30 percent of their deposits from any single market in which they are considered to be multimarket institutions. Perhaps for this reason, the results reported are quite robust regarding alternative choices of the threshold used to define a multimarket bank.
The samples include observations of both commercial banks and thrift institutions, which will frequently be referred to generically as "banks. 14 Use of the traditional concentration measure, which accounts for all banks with a presence in the market, yields statistically significant coefficients with the hypothesized signs in a number of cases. However, results are generally "weaker" than those obtained using measures of concentration that seek to exclude multimarket banks. This is consistent with the notion that multimarket banks, because they charge the same prices everywhere, are unlikely to exhibit pricing behavior that varies with the concentration of an individual market in which they are observed.
As noted by an anonymous referee, a negative coefficient of the interaction term could result if the measure of concentration that best explains single-market bank fees is in fact the traditional measure and if the traditional measure and This difference also reflects a change in the sample design between the two years. In both samples, however, somewhat more than 60 percent of surveyed single-market institutions were located in MSAs.
While observations of multimarket banks are, by design, not used in estimations of (1) Table 2 This compares with a median size of about $6 billion in assets for surveyed multimarket banks, so the difference in institution size between the two groups is quite large indeed.
Results
For each of the samples, table 3 compares the fees charged by multimarket and single-market banks, as defined above. These data indicate strongly that multimarket banks charge, on average, higher retail fees than do single-market banks. For stoppayment orders in 1999, for example, the data presented in the column under "stoppay"
show that multimarket banks charged on average $19.48, whereas single-market banks charged, on average, $15.11, a statistically significant difference of $4.37. This difference increased to $7.09 in 2001. Similar statistically significant differences are shown for most other fees as well. Only the fee for "deposit items returned" was greater at single-market banks than at multimarket banks (in both years), but these difference are not statistically significant.
It is possible that these observed differences in average fees result because of differences in the locations in which multimarket and single-market banks in the sample are observed. One way to control for locational differences is to calculate the average difference in fees for each of the markets in which the fees of both multimarket and single-market banks are observed and then to calculate the mean of those differences. As indicated in the fourth row of table 3, this exercise yields differences between multimarket and single-market banks (multimarket bank fee minus single-market bank fee) that are positive in all six cases and statistically significant in three cases. -is the question of whether multimarket banks charge the same retail fee in the different markets in which they operate. As noted above, substantial evidence indicates that they offer the same deposit rates in different areas. Because the survey employed in this study draws its sample through random selection, it is not designed to obtain many cases of multiple observations of the same bank in different areas. 17 Thus, the notion that 15 The reason for this difference appears to be that the 2001 survey design placed more emphasis on interviewing banks at their headquarters, and relatively few banks fit the requirement of having less than 30 percent of their deposits in the market in which they are headquartered. 16 This finding of higher retail deposit fees charged by multimarket banks than by single market banks is multimarket banks charge the same fees in the different areas in which they operate cannot be tested directly and is instead treated as a maintained assumption for the purpose of the tests reported below.
Tables 4 and 5 report estimations of equation (1) Little support is found for the exercise of firm-specific market power, as measured by branch share. The coefficients of branch share, brshare i , are positive, as predicted if the variable proxies firm-specific market power. In only one case, however, is the coefficient of this variable statistically significant.
The nature of the remaining three fees used as dependent variables requires more discussion. The fee for a deposit item returned (depreturn) is a charge levied on a depositor who deposits (rather than writes) a check that is returned by the paying bank (because of insufficient funds, for example). The levying of this fee has caused controversy because some have argued that the depositor is not at fault when a deposited check is found to be drawn on insufficient funds and that charging the depositor in such cases is therefore unreasonable. Others argue that such fees may provide a useful incentive for depositors not to accept checks thought likely to be returned and that depository institutions have a right to recover their cost in ways available to them. rather than deposits because this approach seems more in keeping with the spatial models of Barros (1999) and Park and Pennacchi (2005) . Measurement of these variables in terms of deposit shares, rather than branch shares, yields results that do not differ qualitatively from those reported above.
Second, estimations conducted using MSA markets only and rural markets only do not yield results that appear markedly different from those reported above for the full sample, except that levels of statistical significance are lower as a result of the smaller number of observations. 20 Inclusion of a binary variable indicating operation in an urban market in estimations that employ the full sample does not alter qualitatively the results of primary interest in the study. The inclusion of this variable does, however, substantially alter the coefficient of ln(mktpop) in some regressions because these variables are highly correlated. 20 Coefficient magnitudes suggest that the variables containing hhi play a greater role in rural markets than in urban ones and that the variable i mmshare plays a greater role in urban markets than in rural ones. However, tests for differences in these coefficients fail to reject the hypothesis that they are the same. The division of the samples according to whether the market is above or below the median size, rather than according to the whether the market is an MSA, yields many more markets and observations in the "small Next, because thrift institutions as well as commercial banks are included as observations, it is natural to consider whether significant differences exist in the pricing of the two types of institution. Tests for intercept differences are statistically significant, with differing signs, in a few cases. Tests for coefficient differences between the two types of institution, however, invariably fail to reject the hypothesis that coefficients are the same. Exclusion of thrift institutions from the sample yields results that are the same qualitatively as those reported above.
Although the median size of the single-market banks in the two annual samples is barely over $100 million in assets (table 2) Restricting the sample to those institutions that have at least 90 percent of their deposits in one market excludes a substantial number of institutions that might be included under a less demanding definition. 21 A relaxation of the definition of singlemarket bank to 75 percent, for example, would add an additional fifty institutions to the market" category. Consequently, most of the statistically significant results are observed for this category (not reported). 21 This choice reflects the precedent set by Hannan and Prager (2004) , whose interest rate study had available to it virtually the entire population of banks in the United States.
data set and add to the number of statistically significant coefficients in some cases, particularly in the case of the 2001 sample.
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Conclusion
This paper reports a systematic examination of the determinants of retail banking fees using an extensive set of survey data that is unusual for its size, specificity, and sampling properties. Data on six different fees and for two different years--1999 and 2001--are employed. The paper reports a number of findings regarding the differences in the level of these fees across banks and areas. In a preliminary examination, multimarket banks (where markets are defined as MSAs or non-MSA counties) are found to charge, on average, substantially higher fees than do single-market banks.
With the sample restricted to the large number of surveyed banks that operate predominantly in one market, regression results reported using the larger 1999 sample of depository institutions produce the following findings: For the most common retail fees that every bank charges, banks in more concentrated markets tend to charge higher fees, all else equal, a finding consistent with the predictions of the structure-conductperformance paradigm. Consistent with predictions, this relationship is found to become weaker, the greater the presence of typically large, multimarket banks in the market.
Even for this sample of single-market banks, larger institutions are found to charge higher fees than do smaller ones, all else equal. Furthermore, except for the ATM charges, fees are found to be higher in larger markets, all else equal. 22 For example, the number of observations in the 2001 overdraft regression increases from 299 to 345 with this change and results in a coefficient of hhi that is positive and significant at the 10 percent level and a coefficient of mmshare i x hhi that is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. Detailed results are available from the author upon request. The symbols + and ** denote significance at the 10 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Table 4 The Relationship between Retail Deposit Fees and their Determinants, 1999 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) The symbols +, *, and ** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Table 5 The Relationship between Retail Deposit Fees and their Determinants, 2001 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) The symbols +, *, and ** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
